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ABSTRACT: With the advent of the Falcon, the capability of launch on demand will be an important asset of a
Western commercial launcher for small satellites for the first time. While this capability is possessed by all
military missiles, only those from the former Soviet Union were developed into small launchers which retained
their responsive access characteristics unimpaired. Furthermore, quite large launchers, the Cyclone and Zenit 2
were produced with this ability.
In this paper the responsive access concept, its advantages and its implications for the launcher market are
examined and assessed. Russian and Ukrainian launchers are examined and their suitability for meeting present
day requirements for responsive access and their capabilities are compared with that of the Falcon. Possible
developments in small satellite technology that may be stimulated by the general availability of a responsive
access to space are described.
it is evident that the concept could be realised for
this class of launchers with less expenditure and
effort. Besides, the small launch vehicles of this
concept would be more in demand since both the
military-purpose satellites to be urgently deployed
and the civil spacecraft of ‘poor’ customers should
be of the small class as well.

1. INTRODUCTION
The term ‘responsive access’ arose relatively
recently. It covers a general concept which was
recognized by its initiators, a range of specialists in
U.S. space-concerned companies and organizations
as the creation of a capability to launch various
payloads into space with a minimum time of prelaunch preparation and for a minimum launch cost.
By the opinion initially announced by the concept’s
developers, the realisation of this concept should
give an opportunity to provide access into space for
a range of spacecraft for various purposes while the
spacecraft customers, developers and manufacturers
would enjoy the opportunity to launch their
spacecraft not only at cheap launch prices but also
without the preliminary ordering of a launch which
is usually no less than a year for small spacecraft
and even a few years for heavy geostationary
satellites. Instead, the ‘responsive access’ concept
foresaw the launch of the contracted spacecraft
within a few of weeks or even days of the request
for the launch. This promised feature of the concept
received its own appellation of ‘quick response’ or
‘launch on request’ while the ‘responsive access’
term meant a combination of this opportunity with
the availability of these launchers at prices which
would attract not only just the military or
government users, but commercial users as well.
Therefore, the realisation of the concept should
provide access to space for a greater number of
potential customers and also expand their variety.

With the addition of this aspect, the current
‘responsive access’ concept is a direct evolution of
that of ‘Smaller, Faster and Cheaper’ which the
U.S. space industry was trying to realise during the
nineties in regard to both spacecraft and launch
vehicles. The realisation of this concept actually
failed at that time (the U.S. specialists were even
joking: ‘You can choose any two goals from this
slogan but not all three’). However, apparently, the
experience which was gained during the attempt is
being used now.
At the same time, this preceding attempt was not
the first example of the implementation of a similar
concept. Certain developments which were
undertaken in the former Soviet Union (FSU)
foresaw the realisation of actually the same
principles which are laid down into the ‘responsive
access’ concept. These developments were led up
to the stage of operation or at least flight tests, in
contrast with the significantly lower number of
similar U.S. projects (for example, the ‘MinutemanIV’ project which proposed the quick deployment
of a constellation of orbital warheads with
‘Minuteman’-type ballistic missiles actually used as
small class launch vehicles for this purpose) that
were not realised at all. Such launch vehicles which
were created in the frame of FSU developments, i.e.
the ‘Cyclone’ and ‘Zenit’, remain in operation up to
the current time.

Such new advanced launch vehicles as the ‘Falcon’
of the Space X company and the ‘Sprite’ of the
Microcosm company are being developed taking
into consideration the ‘responsive access’ concept.
Although the ‘Falcon’ family project foresees the
development of a few launch vehicles of various
classes, the foregoing ‘Falcon-1’ which has carried
out its maiden launch (true, an unsuccessful one) is
a small class launch vehicle as is the ‘Sprite’, since
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Besides this, those currently operated Russian small
launch vehicles which were converted from
ballistic missiles since the USSR collapse retain,
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the provision of a specific launch cost lower than
the corresponding values which are being provided
by current common launch vehicles of the same
class.

completely or partially, certain capabilities for
fulfilling the ‘responsive access’ concept which
were inherited by them from their basic missiles.
It is necessary to note that a significant share of the
above-mentioned developments were carried out in
Ukraine, which was a part of the USSR at that time
but is now an independent country. However,
despite those launch vehicles in which the concept
was realised, the ‘Cyclone’ and ‘Zenit’, now being
Ukraine-built products, their production is provided
with deliveries of certain main systems from Russia
and their operation is being carried out with
significant Russian participation. The single
Ukrainian prime space company, the ‘Yuzhnoye’
NPO, developed a range of launch system projects
which could be partially suitable for the ‘responsive
access’ concept realisation (these projects were
concerned with the use of converted ballistic
missiles and their air launch), however, their
realisation is impossible for political and other
reasons. Therefore, it is possible to consider that
Russia is now the only country of the USSR heirs
which not only owns the concerned experience but
is operating the corresponding launch vehicles and
is developing new launch systems which should
have the same capabilities with a high chance for
these projects being realised. For this reason, this
report discusses the FSU experience (including the
experience which was gained in Ukraine) and the
current Russian capabilities and potential in this
field.

These requirements are listed above in the order of
their importance to the ‘responsive access’
conception. Indeed, if the first requirement of
‘quick response’ is not met, the system cannot be
considered to be used for the supposed purpose at
all. This requirement is mostly concerned with the
launch vehicle which is a part of the system. A nonmeeting of the second requirement means that the
system would be suitable for the provision of a
‘quick response’ for individual satellites. A meeting
of the third requirement is a desirable but not
indispensable condition for the achievement of the
concept’s primary goal. It has a greater importance
for the achievement of a secondary goal i.e. the
servicing of civil (commercial) launch customers.
As is remarked in the Introduction, there were
repeated attempts to realise the ‘responsive access’
concept in the former Soviet Union (FSU). These
attempts had been concerned with the primary goal
of the concept. The developed systems which were
inherited by Russia and Ukraine keep the
corresponding capabilities and will be examined for
the current concept realisation mostly for the
achievement of the secondary goal. Besides, certain
launch systems which are being currently
developed in Russia would also provide the same
capability to a greater or lesser degree.

2. THE RESPONSIVE ACCESS CONCEPT
(RAC)

3. THE FALCON AND THE RAC
The idea behind the ‘responsive access’ concept
was clearly formed by the time the information on
the FALCON (‘Force Application and Launch from
CONUS’) U.S programme was published in
November 20031 although the ‘responsive access’
term had been mentioned still earlier in the title of
the RASCAL (‘Responsible Access, Small Cargo
Affordable Launch’) conceptual study which was
contracted by the U.S. DARPA in 20022. A number
of projects were developed in the United States in
the frames of this concept realisation and two of
them, the ‘Falcon-1’ and ‘Quick Reach-1’, have
achieved the stage of real tests.

Generalizing the requirements for any launch
system, whether based on small class launch
vehicles or on launch vehicles of heavier classes,
that can be considered a ‘responsive access’
concept’s launch system, it is possible to formulate
the following requirements which should be met by
this system.
Requirement 1. The system has to be capable of
providing the launch of small satellites, if only one
satellite in a single launch, within a few days after a
request.
Requirement 2. The system has to provide the
launch of a few satellites with a minimum interval
between their launches. This interval should not
exceed the time of the launch vehicle pre-launch
preparation after a request. The systems in which
the launch vehicles are of classes heavier than the
small class should provide the capability of multisatellite launches.

Although the FALCON and RASCAL’s
requirements were different in regard of payload
mass to be launched, 454 kg (1000 pounds) and
75 kg accordingly (true, into different orbit
altitudes, 185 km and 500 km), both the
programmes coincided in the requirement to
provide a launch after a request within a very short
time, 24-48 hours.

Requirement 3. The cost of launch to be provided
by the system should be at a minimum level, with
Webb
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launch price of US$ 110 mln.4, this value is slightly
less than US$ 8,000 i.e. less than that which was
required for the launch systems to be developed for
the FALCON programme.

The same requirements were also repeated in the
more recent European RLS (Rapid Launch System)
conceptual project3. Therefore, it is possible to
consider that the requirement to provide a launch
during the period of 48 hours, with its following
shortening down to 24 hours, is a main requirement
for the ‘responsive access’ concept realisation in
any concerned project.

At the same time, current small class expendable
launch vehicles have launch prices at the level of
US$ 10-20 mln. for a ton of payload mass i.e. their
specific launch prices are US$ 10,000-20,000 per
kilogram.

Although the European RLS project did not foresee
any future application as a carrier of strategic
weapons, its goals are bound directly to the task of
the urgent deployment of military-concerned
spacecraft for a ‘quick response’ in a corresponding
situation, while any application for civil mission
servicing was not foreseen. This task can be
considered to be at a strategic level for Europe
since, in contrast with the United States, it has not
any defined plans for the deployment of
conceptually new strategic systems. This explains
both the announced high launch price and the
expected low annual rate of launches (2-3 per
year3).

Therefore, the financial aspect of the ‘responsive
access’ concept is, actually, not the task to decrease
the specific launch cost for military-purpose
satellite injections in a comparison with the level
which was achieved for the preceding heavier
satellites by heavier classes of launch vehicles. The
task is to approximate those specific launch prices
to be provided by the new launch systems to the
level achieved previously while an opportunity to
decrease the masses of the satellites themselves,
thanks to the applications of new advanced
technologies would provide a decrease in the total
launch prices for the missions to be fulfilled.

Another feature of interest which is distinctive for
all the ‘responsive access’ systems that are being
developed is that these systems are intended for the
launch of small or even super-small payloads. This
feature can be explained, of course, by the fact that
those satellites which have to be launched by these
launch systems should be as least expensive as
possible and, therefore, should be attributed to the
class of small spacecraft. Moreover, current
technologies allow the building of small satellites
for the same missions which were previously being
fulfilled by satellites of significantly heavier classes
(for example, in the field of ERS). However, it is
interesting to compare the specific launch prices
which were laid down into these systems to be
created with the specific launch prices which were
(and are) being provided by those expendable
launch vehicles that are being used for the launches
of heavier satellites for the same purposes. For
example, the Russian ‘Proton’ heavy launch vehicle
can provide the injection of a 24-ton payload mass
into low-Earth orbit (LEO) with an altitude of 200
km at a launch cost of around US$ 30 mln. (This
launch cost is not the launch price which is being
offered for commercial launches but it is paid by
Russian governmental bodies for launches in the
frames of national missions.) Therefore, the
achieved specific launch price for these specific
missions, which are similar to the state-ordered
missions to be carried out with a use of the
‘responsive access’ concept launch systems, is
around US$ 1,250 per kilogram, which is more than
4 times less than the best value which is supposed
for the RASCAL system (see above). Even in the
worst example with a use of the U.S. ‘Titan-2’ with
its 14-ton LEO payload capability at a commercial
Webb

Of course, this decrease in the specific launch
prices in comparison with the current level for the
small class of launch vehicles must have a great
importance for those potential civil launch
customers who cannot use heavier launch vehicles
for either reason (mostly due to the small sizes and
masses of their spacecraft). The impact on the
worldwide and U.S. domestic space market from
the appearance of a certain U.S. low-cost small
launch vehicle (SLV) to be developed in the frame
of the ‘responsive access’ concept (the ‘Falcon-1’
was implied) was investigated in detail in a CST
report5. However, as is shown above, this particular
advantage of the ‘responsive access’ concept’s
launch systems is not a key factor in the
achievement of the concept’s main (primary) goal.
The determinant factor is rather the task of
providing the system’s capability to provide an
urgent launch after a request within a few days
instead of the current duration of a few months (in
the best case!) for the launch vehicle preparation.
Due to this feature, the ‘responsive access’ concept
is often being called the ‘quick response’ concept.
Actually, this means that the choice in the selection
of two terms from the ‘Faster, Smaller and
Cheaper’ slogan which is mentioned in the
Introduction above has been made in favour of
‘Faster and Smaller’.
However, as was exposed in the CST report5, a
probable realisation of the ‘quick response’ reduced
concept in a certain launch system does not provide
the achievement of the ‘responsive access’
concept’s primary goal i.e. the capability to
urgently deploy a constellation (constellations) of
3
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have lost some if not all of their ability to fulfil
RAC requirements. Therefore, the converted
missiles of the Cyclone family as well as the
Cosmos, Rockot, Strela, Dnepr, Start and Shtil will
be examined to see what abilities they retain.

small satellites or even of a few of these satellites
after a sudden request. Two other conditions have
to be met for this.
First, the duration of the pre-launch preparation for
the satellite to be launched has to be not longer than
for the launch system’s pre-launch preparation after
the request. This condition has to be met by the
corresponding satellite developers proceeding from
the known time of the launch system’s pre-launch
preparation (probably, on the basis of the ‘plug,
sense and play’ concept application).

Then, a single FSU launch system which was not
derived from a ballistic missile, the ‘Zenit’, will be
discussed because of its potential ability to launch
whole systems of small satellites at time according
to the RAC.
Finally, three projects, Angara, Air Launch and
Ishim will also be examined. Those launchers
which can implement the RAC from all of those
looked at will then be compared with the Falcon-1.

The second condition is that the launch system
should have a permanently available stock of
almost ready launch vehicles which has to be
sufficient for the servicing of the most probable
number of launches that could be requested
simultaneously. The term ‘almost ready’ implies
that the launch vehicle’s further preparation after
the request has to be carried out within the
announced period of pre-launch preparation. This
condition also includes the requirement that the
system’s launch site has to be prepared for the next
launch during the period of the launch vehicle prelaunch preparation.

The Cyclone Family
The Cyclone is unique among FSU missile systems
in that, even in its first ‘FOBS’ configuration, it
was designed to what was then considered as the
RAC. At the present the production of the top
stages for the Cyclone-3 has stopped and there are a
few Cyclone-2’s remaining in stock. The
production limes have been halted but not
abandoned. Cyclone-4, a Brazilian-Ukrainian
project would be GEO capable if developed and
Cyclone-2K, relevant here, is a Russian-Ukrainian
project.

4. RUSSIAN CANDIDATES FOR
FULFILLING THE RAC
Most of the Russian vehicles discussed had been
developed in the previous regime, the USSR, and
almost all of these launch systems were derived
from basic ballistic missiles which, being weapon
systems, had to provide a high readiness for their
battle use on command.

The ‘Cyclone-2K’ project, which was described in
detail in a CST report6, foresees to equip the former
‘Cyclone-2’ with a third stage. This ADU-600 top
(upper) stage should eliminate the ‘Cyclone-2’s’
shortcoming which is expressed in the impossibility
to launch those satellites which could not boost
themselves at the final leg of the injection
trajectory. Therefore, this improvement would
expand the launcher’s range of potential payloads,
moreover, a capability to provide multi-satellite
launches is, apparently, foreseen in the project as
well. At the same time, the ADU-600 stage (it is
shown in Figure 1) is an up-graded version of a
Russian submarine-launched ballistic missile’s
(SLBM’s) post-boost stage which keeps this postboost stage’s distinctive feature – this stage is
fuelled with propellant in its manufacturing plant
with a following ‘ampoulization’7. Therefore, this
stage will not complicate and prolong the process
of the launcher preparation at the launch site. This
means that the times of this preparation will remain
the same as those which were provided by the basic
‘Cyclone-2’.

Therefore, requirement 1 was actually met in the
early sixties and the main problems with the
realisation of that time’s ‘responsive access’ (that
was really required from time to time in order to
replace a satellite which had failed in orbit) were
concerned mostly with the existence of another
satellite for the replacement and with a long time
for its preparation and with the inter-launch
preparation of the launch facility. However, these
problems were being solved by the common FSU
practice of that time by having a back-up spacecraft
in a high degree of pre-launch readiness and to have
a second launch facility for any type of launch
vehicle. This allowed the launch of the back-up
satellite within a few of days of a request. So,
requirement 2 was met as well.
Nobody even thought about a meeting of the
requirement 3 (a saving of funds) at that time.
However, since that time most of the missiles,
during their conversion into commercial launchers
Webb
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of potential customers would wish to launch
satellites with masses of 300 kg and less.
Of course, the situation could be saved by a use of
the cluster launch method. However, as experience
has shown, to search for a number of various small
satellites which would be launched simultaneously
into near orbits is a complicated task by itself.
Nevertheless, if even this task will be solved for the
‘Cyclone-2K’, a second obstacle should arise in the
process of meeting this supposed demand by a high
rate of launches. As it is mentioned above, the
serial production of the ‘Cyclone’ launch vehicle is
currently absent although certain capabilities for its
restoration are retained in the ‘Yuzhnoye’ NPO’s
‘Yuzhmash’ Plant. These capabilities should be
used for an establishment of the ‘Cyclone-4’
option’s serial production in the case of the
Ukrainian/Brazilian project’s success. As it was
shown in the CST report6, this newly-established
serial production would provide an expanded
operation of the Russian/Ukrainian ‘Cyclone-2K’
as well. However, if the ‘Cyclone-4’ project fails,
this production will not be restored especially for
the ‘Cyclone-2K’ project, which foresees only the
use of the available stocks of the ‘Cyclone-2’
launch vehicles that would be transformed into the
‘Cyclone-2K’ option).

Fig. 1. The ADU-600 stage
At the same time, the ‘Cyclone-2K’ should use the
‘Cyclone-2’s’ technical and launch sites in
Baikonur with the launch site retaining those
features which were providing the realised ‘quick
response’ capability for the basic ‘Cyclone-2’.
Moreover, the technical site’s capacity could be
expanded in the case of demand by a moderate
reconstruction of some other technical sites which
are being in a laid-up condition in Baikonur (as was
recently used for an expansion of the ‘Proton’ and
‘Sojuz’ commercial operation). Certain of these
laid-up technical sites’ facilities would also be used
as storehouses for a provision of the ‘responsive
access’ concept realisation (for civil purposes, of
course) in the case of the corresponding demand
appearing in the world’s space market.

This direct dependence of the expansion of the
‘Cyclone-2K’ future operation on either the success
or failure of the ‘Cyclone-4’ project, for which
itself the prospects are not so clear, aggravates still
more the doubts about the potential suitability of
the ‘Cyclone-2K’ launch system for a supposed
realisation of the ‘responsive access’ concept.
For these considerations, the ‘Cyclone’ launch
system in all of its options cannot be assessed as a
potential competitor in Section 5 below. It remains
an example of an FSU first launch system which
was developed and even used partially, especially
for the ‘quick response’ concept realisation, but
cannot be currently used any more even for the
same purpose, to say nothing about the ‘responsive
access’ concept.

However, there are at least two serious obstacles
which would, if not prevent, then significantly
complicate the realisation of the ‘responsive access’
by the ‘Cyclone-2K’ launch system. First is the
high payload capability of the ‘Cyclone’ launcher
in all its options and, therefore, its high launch
prices.
Even if the ‘Cyclone-2K’ would provide the same
specific launch price which was announced in
May 2002 of US$ 8,000 per
kilogram for
commercial launches8, which is even better than the
corresponding
value
for
the
U.S.
FALCON/RASCAL programmes, the total launch
price would be around US$ 15 mln. The ‘Cyclone2K’ should launch up to 1.8-2.0 tons of payload
into sun-synchronous orbits and its price would be
found to be a quite unacceptable value for potential
civil customers with their small spacecraft with
masses which do not exceed one ton in the best
case, while an overwhelming majority of these sort
Webb

Cosmos
The usual operation of the ‘Cosmos-3M’ and its
features were described in numerous sources. At
the current time, the launch system’s capability to
provide a ‘quick response’ has been decreased since
one of the Plesetsk’s three launch facilities was
reconstructed for launches of the ‘Rockot’ launch
vehicle and another one was laid up. The arsenal in
the Tambov Region does not have these launch
vehicles any more and they are being delivered
from the ‘Polyot’ PO’s Plant in Omsk with a long
5
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constellations would deprive the USSR troops,
including nuclear forces, of any space support
(reconnaissance data in real time, communications,
navigation service, etc.) and, therefore, would
seriously complicate the battle actions of these
troops.

duration for this delivery. The production of the
launch vehicles is being provided at a low rate by
the method of ‘cannibalism’ i.e. the use of certain
suitable parts of those launchers for which the
lifetimes are already expired in a combination with
a number of newly manufactured parts (see
references 8 and 9). Although information on the
full-scale restoration of the ‘Cosmos-3M’
production at ‘Polyot’ is arising from time to time
in the Russian mass-media, the probability of this is
very low since this restoration would be done only
with a replacement of all the Ukraine-built parts by
products of Russian industry. The share of the
Ukraine-built parts is more than 50% in the
‘Cosmos-3M’ launch vehicle and, therefore, it
would be more reasonable to build another, more
advanced launch vehicle instead of this obsolete
launcher. However, the ‘Polyot’ can not find the
corresponding funding since its financial state is not
good.

Since the in-space defence of in-orbit satellites was
as yet a prospect for the far future during the late
seventies – early eighties, the problem could be
solved by a replenishment of the damaged
constellations with ‘war-time’ satellites, i.e.
satellites which should have the same purposes and
capabilities (probably, with a certain limitation in
regard of lifetime duration, etc. in order to decrease
the masses and complication of the satellites) but
should be launched already in the process of the
war.
It was evident that these ‘war-time’ satellites should
be launched as urgently as possible (due to the
supposed short time of the war conflict’s
escalation) from a standby condition of the launch
vehicles. Besides, these launch vehicles with
already mated satellites should be protected
permanently (at least during the periods of arising
of war threat) against a potential enemy’s attacks of
any sort, including attacks by ballistic missiles
equipped with nuclear warheads.

For these reasons, the ‘Cosmos-3M’ can be
considered at the current time as a launch system
which actually has no capabilities to provide an
urgent launch of any satellite on request. Due to
this, the system is not assessed in Section 5 below
as a probable competitor for a realisation of the
‘responsive access’ concept in the worldwide
market of launch services. Instead, the ‘Cosmos’
family can be considered a first in the FSU example
of a realised and operated launch system which,
thanks to certain unpremeditated preconditions,
received capabilities to provide ‘responsive access’
to a certain degree, but these capabilities were not
demanded.

It was also evident that these ‘protected’ launch
vehicles would be created relatively simply on the
basis of silo-based ICBMs. Moreover, a vast
experience of space launch vehicle developments
on a basis of ICBMs had already been gained in the
USSR while certain USSR’s silo-based ICBMs of
that time could provide a sufficient payload
capability thanks to their high power potential.
Probably, the heavy ICBMs of the R-36M type (SS18 by the Western designation) could be the best
candidates for this role since their power potential
was near to that which the ‘Cyclone’ had. Besides,
this type of ICBM had a sufficiently powerful postboost stage which could provide the deployment of
a few of the ‘war-time’ satellites in a single launch.

Rockot
As was shown in the preceding section, the
realisation of the ‘quick response’ concept in the
USSR which was carried out in the frame of the
‘Cyclone-2/3’ launch system development was
concerned
with
military-purpose
missions.
However, these missions had to be fulfilled
exclusively during the times which would precede
any large-scale war conflicts.

However, these ICBMs were not so numerous as
other types of less heavy ICBMs while the
restrictions of the U.S./USSR acting Strategic
Armament Reduction Treaty (START) did not
allow to increase the number of launch sites for any
type of ICBMs. (The space launch vehicles that
were converted from the ICBMs which were
included into Treaty frame of action were
considered to remain in ICBM capacity from the
Treaty’s point of view). Therefore, a conversion of
these SS-18 ICBMs share into the new launch
vehicles for the launches of the ‘war-time’ satellites
with a deployment of these launch vehicles in a
corresponding number of the SS-18’s launch sites

Indeed, the ‘Cyclone’ launch system’s on-ground
infrastructure had a low protection against enemy
air raids (this protection could be provided only by
the country’s anti-aircraft defence or its domestic
detachments) to say nothing about attacks with a
use of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
However, as was evident for the USSR military
supreme command, a probable nuclear war conflict
of any scale would include an enemy’s attack
against the USSR military-purpose satellite
constellations.
Any damage or, worse, destruction of these
Webb
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should mean a shortening of the most effective part
of the Soviet offensive nuclear force.
A choice was made in a favour of the less heavy
(about 105 tons of lift-off mass against around 200
tons for the SS-18) but sufficiently powerful UR100 NU ICBM (15A35 by its military designation
or SS-19 by its Western designation). This ICBM
had been developed by the Academician
V. Chelomey – led Design Bureau which later
received the ‘Salyut’ DB appellation (it is currently
part of the Khrunichev Space Center).
This ICBM was deployed, beginning from 1975, in
numerous launch silos which had a strong
protection against near nuclear explosions. The
ICBMs were stored in a fuelled conditions for a
number of years in a standby state from which they
could be launched within a few of minutes after
receiving a command. The SS-19’s power potential
could provide the launch of a payload with a mass
of 1-1.5 tons into LEO, but its post-boost stage
which had to pull apart three warheads along
different trajectories (in an accordance with the
MIRV concept)10 had too low power potential for
the deployment of numerous payloads along orbits
which would differ significantly in altitudes and
inclinations.

Fig. 2. The general configuration of the ‘Rockot’
launch vehicle’s early silo-based version (left)
and its payload accommodation zone (right)

The ‘war-time’ launch system which later received
the ‘Rockot’ appellation (its real appellation of that
time as well as its military designation remain
classified to the present time) was developed on the
basis of the UR-100NU by the mid-eighties at the
level of an engineering project. The main difference
with the basic missile was an introduction of the
‘Breeze’ especially developed upper stage instead
of the removed post-boost stage. The missile’s
control/guidance system was also replaced with a
new system of digital type which had an on-board
computer.

The first orbital mission was completed on
December 26, 1994. The ‘Radio-ROSTO’ Russian
radio-amateur small satellite was successfully
launched.

Two test silo facilities for the SS-19s in Baikonur
were begun to be up-graded. One of them was
ready in 1990 and the first launch of the ‘Rockot’
was carried out from it at the end of that year along
a sub-orbital trajectory. The second sub-orbital
testing launch was carried out after a year, in
December 1991. These launches were dedicated to
the in-flight testing/verification of the new ‘Breeze’
upper stage and this task was successfully solved.

However, before that time, the collapse of the
USSR had occurred in 1991 and post-USSR Russia
had no demand for ‘war-time’ launch systems for
this sort of ‘quick response’ due to, mostly, a lack
of funds. These funds would be required not only
for a deployment of the ‘Rockot’ launch systems in
a certain number of up-graded launch silos but also
for the development of corresponding ‘war-time’
satellites which had not yet been begun.

The configuration of the first, silo-based ‘Rockot’
launch vehicle’s version, is shown in Figure 2
together with its payload accommodation zone’s
configuration.

A brief description of the ‘Rockot’ launcher’s
design can be found in the book11.

So, the ‘Rockot’ system
Russian government to
Khrunichev Space Center
DB had become a part)
operation.

Despite the SS-19’s launch site being suitable for
this ‘Rockot’ launcher accommodation, the silo had
to be up-graded in order to provide launches of this
launch vehicle. This up-grading was concerned
mostly with the replacement of the former SS-19’s
launch control equipment.

Webb

was ‘granted’ by the
the newly established
(of which the ‘Salyut’
for future commercial

Initially, the Khrunichev’s top management had an
intention to use the existing launch silo in Baikonur
for a provision of the ‘Rockot’s’ commercial
launches. There were also plans to put into
operation the second launch silo in Baikonur and
even to up-grade five SS-11 launch silos in the new
7
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December 5, 2003 (see Figure 4). This created
certain inconveniences in the launcher’s operation
(for example, the silo with the installed launch
vehicle should be protected by a special removable
cover against rains and dusty winds), however, this
was actually a ‘payment’ for the opportunity to use
the SS-19’s silo without any serious up-gradings.

Russian Svobodny spaceport for the same purpose.
However, these plans were finally declined by the
late nineties in favour of a new surface launch site
in Plesetsk. This construction (more exactly, a reconstruction of one of the ‘Cosmos-3M’s’ launch
facilities) was carried out in the frame of the
Khrunichev/German DASA company (‘Astrium’ at
the current time) collaboration.
This collaboration was realised through the
‘Eurockot’ Joint Venture establishment as well as
the ‘Rockot’ operation which was being provided
by this JV. The most important fact which was
concerned with this re-organization was that the
‘Rockot’ launch vehicle itself was slightly
improved in order to be more suitable for
commercial launches from the surface launch
facility instead of the former launch silo.
So, the current ‘Rockot’ which is being operated
from Plesetsk cannot provide a realisation of the
‘quick response’ concept to say nothing about the
‘responsive access’ concept.
However, the former realisation of the ‘Rockot’s’
silo-based version remains to be the only-in-the
world example of a ‘quick response’ concept’s silobased launch system which was adapted very well
even for the conditions of nuclear war.
In contrast with the ‘Cyclone’, this version of the
‘Rockot’ could provide an urgent launch from a
stand-by condition (the maintaining of which was
also provided by the launch system) but could not
provide an urgent repeated launch from the same
silo (the required inter-launch repair of the silo had
a duration of no less than two weeks). So, the
launch system was really better adapted for the
launches of required satellites during a war than for
these launches during peaceful times.

Fig. 3. The design of the ‘Strela’ launch vehicle

Strela
The ‘Strela’ launch vehicle, the design of which is
shown in Figure 3 is actually the UR-100NU
(SS-19) ICBM in which the post-boost stage (it was
called the ‘Aggregate/Instrumental Unit’ in the
developer’s advertising materials) was kept and
used as the launcher’s third (top) stage. Differences
of the ‘Strela’ from the basic SS-19 are only in the
new flight software, an introduction of a telemetry
equipment compartment (it was being used with the
missile’s flight testing examples) and a new larger
nose fairing under which an adapter for space
payload mating is installed. With this nose fairing,
the converted launch vehicle can not be covered
with a launch silo’s hardened lid and this lid was
permanently opened when the ‘Strela’ was prepared
for its first (and single as yet) test launch on
Webb

Fig. 4. The ‘Strela’ launch vehicle in its launch
site before a test launch. The open hardened lid
of the launch silo is well seen on the left
Not having a powerful upper stage, the ‘Strela’ can
launch significantly less payload mass than its
‘half-brother’ ‘Rockot’. Thus, it could inject around
1000 kg only into a circular orbit with an altitude of
8
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upper stage would be most suitable for the urgent
launches of satellite clusters in the frame of the
‘responsive access’ concept realisation. However,
this concept, in its current understanding does not
especially require these group launches.

1000 km (the ‘Strela’s’ performance and
description of design were given in reference 12)
i.e. almost half that of the ‘Rockot’. However, the
‘Strela’s’ expected launch price would be
significantly less as well: US$ 8.5 mln against
around US$ 13 mln for the ‘Rockot’8.

If these group launches would not be demanded at
all or will be very rare, the ‘Dnepr’ will lose the
competition against less heavy launch vehicles with
similar capabilities on ‘quick response’ provision.
For this reason, the ‘Dnepr’ is not assessed in
Section 5 below.

The ‘Strela’ was tested successfully from a silo in
Baikonur but its operation is foreseen from
Svobodny where one of the former SS-11 silos
which had been supposed to be used for the
‘Rockot’ (see above) has been almost completely
re-constructed for the ‘Strela’. The ‘Strela’ launch
system’s developer, the Research and Production
Association for Machinebuilding (NPOM) have an
intention to use later the remaining four launch sites
in Svobodny. Besides, a large number of SS-19
launch silos would be available in missile bases
since the former START Treaty’s prohibition to
launch spacecraft by converted launch vehicles
from their basic missiles’ bases is not in action
anymore while the corresponding launch silos are
gradually becoming free of their missiles due to the
expiration of their lifetimes.

Start
The ‘Start’ family of small launch vehicles includes
the ‘Start-1’ four-stage option and the ‘Start’ fivestage option (they are shown in Figure 5) which are
derived from the Russian ‘Topol’ (SS-25) solidpropellant ICBM (a history of the ‘Start’ family
development and operation can be found in
reference 8 while its brief description and its
performance were given in reference 13).
Although no intention to provide a ‘quick-response’
capability for Soviet missions was taken into
consideration when the ‘Start’ project was begun to
be developed in the late eighties, the resulting
launch system inherited the specific features of the
basic ICBM including that part which could
promote the ‘responsive access’ concept realisation.

A combination of these circumstances makes the
‘Strela’ a serious candidate for a realisation of the
‘responsive access’ concept in Russia in the case of
a corresponding demand appearing. This launch
system’s potential in this regard is assessed in
Section 5 below.
Dnepr
The ‘Dnepr’ launch system which was converted
from the RS-36M1 (SS-18) heavy ICBM and is
being currently operated beginning from April
21, 1999 by the Russian/Ukrainian ‘Kosmotras’
join stock company from a single launch silo in
Baikonur has its own features, both negative and
positive ones in comparison with the ‘Strela’. Thus,
it has an almost twice the lift-off mass and its
higher power potential allows it to inject more
payload mass, up to more than 4 tons into LEOs,
but this potential would not be realised completely
without an introduction of an especially developed
upper stage as in the ‘Rockot’. Having the same
capability as the ‘Strela’ to provide urgent launches
from silos, the ‘Dnepr’ has to collect a group of
small satellites for every commercial launch which
is complicating the task of mission arrangement.
The ‘Dnepr’s’ developer,
the Ukrainian
‘Yuzhnoye’ NPO intends to introduce this
especially developed upper stage in the nearest
future. This introduction will expand the launcher’s
capabilities in regard to various payloads
deployment in space, but should increase the launch
price.

Fig. 5. The ‘Start’ (left) and
‘Start-1’ launch vehicles

Probably, the improved ‘Dnepr’ with this new
Webb
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not decrease the launch system’s capabilities for the
provision of ‘responsive access’.

Besides a high readiness for launch by command
which was typical for modern ICBMs (the
provision of this readiness for the ‘Topol’ was
simplified with its solid-propellant propulsion units
in all of its stages), the ‘Topol’ was a mobile ICBM
that
could
be
transported
on
its
transportation/launch mobile device mounted on a
heavy truck with all its supplementary on-ground
facilities were mounted on similar trucks as well. A
launch of the missile was provided from an erected
launch canister by the so-called ‘pop-up’ method
i.e. the missile was pushed out from this canister by
a special solid-propellant gas-generator with an
ignition of the first stage’s engine at an altitude
which
guaranteed
no
damage
to
the
transportation/launch device. Of course, the launch
canister was damaged significantly but this canister
was expendable and could be replaced with the new
one (with the new missile inside) within a few
hours. The missiles were being installed inside their
canisters in the manufacturing plant and could be
transported by special heavy trucks following the
complex of the mobile transportation launch device
and the mobile supplementary facilities which
actually formed a ‘mobile launch site’.

Rather, any delays in the process of the system
preparation for urgent launches would be concerned
with the pre-launch preparations of the satellites to
be launched since the ‘Start-1’s’ ‘mobile launch
site’ has not any mobile facilities for satellite
separate preparation. However, both the Plesetsk
and Svobodny spaceports have stationary facilities
for this purpose while the technical site in
Svobodny is especially adapted for the preparation
of payloads for the ‘Start’ launch system1.
True, there are plans to mothball the Svobodny
spaceport as a whole14. However, this information
is mostly concerned with the supposed withdrawal
of Russian Space Troops military units which are
currently servicing the ‘Start-1’ launches from this
spaceport, while further launches of the ‘Start’ and
‘Strela’ (see above) would be serviced by their
operators’ launch crews.
Besides a technical capability to provide not only
urgent launches on response (i.e. a meeting of the
requirement 1 for the ‘responsive access’ concept
realisation) and a technical capability for the
provision of repeat launches within a short period
of time, which is a partial meeting of the
requirement 2, the ‘Start’ launch system has a good
potential for a provision of the launchers in a
necessary number for a complete meeting of this
requirement 2, i.e. for these repeat launches. As
much as 360 ‘Topol’ ICBMs were deployed in
Russia in 199610 and they are being gradually
replaced with the improved ‘Topol-M’ ICBM while
the decommissioned ‘Topol’ ICBMs would be
converted into the ‘Start-1’ or ‘Start’ launch
vehicles for their use in the ‘Start’ launch systems.

From the point of view of the ‘responsive access’
concept, this meant that the derived ‘‘Start’ launch
system, mostly in the ‘Start-1’ option, can be
delivered to any spot on the globe in order to
provide a broad range of available orbit inclinations
and an approximation to the launch customer’s
location. It does not require any stationary launch
or technical sites (although it does not provide for
the pre-launch preparation of satellite and their
mating with the launch vehicles) and, which is
important, provides not only a very urgent launch
on request but could be quickly prepared for a
following launch.

This opportunity enables the relatively low level of
the ‘Start’s’ launch prices, US$ 8 and 10 mln. for
the ‘Start-1’ and ‘Start’ accordingly. With these
launchers’ payload capabilities of 600 and 900 kg,
the
specific
launch
prices
of
about
US$ 11,000…12,000 per kilogram of payload are
being provided which are comparable with the
same value for the U.S. ‘Falcon-1’.

As was shown in reference 5, the ‘Start’ launch
vehicles and, especially, the ‘Start-1’ have a
payload capability which is near to the optimum for
the servicing of those potential customers in the
worldwide space market who would demand a
realisation of the ‘responsive access’ concept.
The slightly heavier ‘Start’ option was launched
only once from Plesetsk on March 28, 1995 and
was not demanded after this as the launch was a
failure. It is necessary to note that launches of both
the ‘Start-1’ and ‘Start’ options from Plesetsk were
being carried out from the so-called ‘transportable’
launch device which was an option of the mobile
launch device which was demounted from the truck
and installed onto fixed supports. Probably, the
longer five-stage ‘Start’ could be launched from
this fixed launch device only. However, this does

Webb

Therefore, the ‘Start’ launch system meets all the
requirements for the ‘responsive access’ concept
realisation due to i) a successful combination of the
inherited ICBM’s capability for an urgent launch
from a long-time stand-by condition, ii) operational
flexibility
provided
by
the
inherited
launch/supplementary devices’ mobility and
capability to be urgently prepared for a repeat
launch and of significant reserves of ready basic
hardware and iii) relatively low launch prices
provided
by
an
availability
of
these
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test launch facility in Nenoksa cannot provide the
urgent preparation of repeat launches even in its
operational condition (this facility is currently in a
condition which requires much repair).

decommissioned reserves at low purchasing prices.
The creation of this launch system can be
considered an example of the Russian experience
on the development of a real ‘responsive access’
concept launch system, although the system’s
‘responsive access’-concerned properties had not
been premeditatedly laid down into this specific
development.
The competitive potential of the ‘Start’ launch
system in regard to meeting the supposed demand
in the worldwide space markets is examined in
Section 5 below.
Shtil
The ‘Shtil’ small launch vehicle family was
developed on the basis of the Russian three-stage
liquid-propellant RSM-54 submarine-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM) in a few options.
However, only the ‘Shtil-1’ and ‘Shtil 2.1’
submarine-launched small space launch vehicles
have been realised so far.

Fig. 6. The ‘Shtil’ family of launch vehicles
converted from the SS-N-23 (RSM-54) SLBM,
from left to right: ‘Shtil-1’, ‘Shtil-2.1’, ‘Shtil-2’,
‘Shtil-3’

The ‘Shtil-1’ is the simplest option which differs
from the basic RSM-54 with a replacement of the
flight software and with an accommodation of a
space payload instead of the SLBM’s warheads (in
a very limited zone of accommodation). This
‘Shtil-1’ is being launched from the Russian Navy’s
nuclear submarines during the submarines’ training
cruises and these launches, which are being
serviced by these submarines’ crews, are being
considered the RSM-54 SLBMs’ training missions
as well.
Due to this ‘combined purpose‘ of the launches, the
launch price for the customers is very low. Despite
the ‘Shtil-1’s’ low payload capability of 160 kg this
provides a good level of specific launch price but,
at the moment, the inevitably required coincidence
of the booked launch term with the schedule of the
Russian Navy’s submarines’ training cruises makes
the ‘Shtil-1’ almost completely unsuitable for a
realisation of the ‘responsive access’ concept.
However, other options of the ‘Shtil’ family (all the
options are shown in Figure 6 and were described
in detail in reference 15) were developed with the
clearly defined destination of being launched from
a surface launch site in the Nenoksa test range
which was used for the test launches of the RSM-54
SLBMs (Figure 7).
Any of the options being realised can provide the
RAC. Indeed, the RSM-54 SLBM’s are being
delivered from the manufacturing plant in a fuelled
condition and, therefore, the SLBM’s launch
vehicle derivatives require a short time for their
pre-launch preparation. Unfortunately, the single
Webb

Fig. 7. Nenoksa test range - Ground-based
launch complex in Nenoksa (NSK-37)
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improved in order to meet the requirements for the
provision of global electronic intelligence both on
land and sea. The absence of an advanced
electronic element base in the FSU led to an
increase of the satellite mass and even the available
‘Sojuz’ launch vehicle with its payload capability
of around 5-6 tons was not suitable for these
launches, to say nothing about it not having the
capability to be urgently launched on request.

Shtil 2.1 began operation this year and CST is
managing a launch of this variant for the South
African government. The satellite is designated
ZA-002 and the launch is scheduled for
December 2006, albeit also from a submarine.
So, it is premature to estimate any competitiveness
of the ‘Shtil’ surface-based options although they
would have a certain potential in the investigated
regard if they will be realised themselves and if the
launch facility in Nenoksa will be restored,
probably, with the introduction of a short interlaunch maintenance capability introduction.

The second supposed payload would be the ‘Zarya’
reusable manned spacecraft which was being
developed in the Central Design Bureau for
Experimental Machinebuilding (TsKBEM, Design
Bureau of the ‘Energia’ RSC at the current time).
This spacecraft which was intended mostly for
servicing the FSU’s manned orbital stations should
provide rescue missions in the cases of necessity
and, therefore, would be launched on response.

The example of the ‘Shtil-1’-concerned experience
shows that the adoption of a ballistic missiles’
capability to be urgently launched on command
(‘response’) does not always lead to the possibility
to use this capability for a realisation of the ‘launch
on response’ concept for those launch systems
which were developed on a basis of these missiles.

Currently, the ‘Zenit-2’ is being operated with a
very low rate of launches from a single launch
facility in Baikonur (the second launch facility was
destroyed in the process of the ‘Zenit’s’ flight
tests). This sole launch facility as well as the
remaining on-ground structure retain the capability
to provide rather the ‘quick response’ than the
‘responsive access’ since the greater share of the
‘Zenit’ production in the ‘Yuzhmash’ Plant is being
delivered for the provision of the ‘Zenit-3SL’
launcher’s operation in the frame of the ‘Sea
Launch’ international company’s activity.

Zenit
The
‘Zenit-2’
two-stage
launch
vehicle
development was begun in 1976 in the frame of the
Soviet launch vehicle fleet renovation. Despite its
first stage being the ‘Energia’ super-heavy launch
vehicle’s strap-on booster, the ‘Zenit’ is actually
the first example of a USSR launch vehicle
(excluding the preceding N1 super-heavy launch
vehicle) which was especially developed for space
purposes and not derived from a ballistic missile.

Another, more recent ‘Land Launch’ project which
is at an early stage of realisation at the present time
would keep the ‘Zenit-2’s’ capability of ‘quick
response’ for its ‘Zenit’-based launch vehicles
which are foreseen in both two-stage and threestage options. This project is based on a use of the
‘Zenit-2’s’ launch site in Baikonur16.

However, the creation of the ‘Zenit-2’ (the digit in
the launcher’s appellation shows the number of
stages as in the ‘Cyclone-3’ appellation) pursued a
military-concerned task nevertheless. This task was
the same one which was solved earlier with the
‘Cyclone’ launch vehicles i.e. the realisation of the
capability to deploy urgently a constellation of
military-purpose satellites within a period of any
serious international conflict or during a pre-war
period. This meant that both the launch vehicle and,
especially, its on-ground technical and launch sites
had to provide an urgent preparation of the launch
with a certain repetition of this launch within a
short period of time.

However, even in the case of the ‘Land Launch’
project realisation with a keeping of the ‘Zenit-2’s’
capability for ‘quick response’ provision, this
improved launch system will inherit the main
shortcoming of the ‘Zenit-2’ in this regard. This
shortcoming is the too high payload capability of
the launch vehicle which is quite unsuitable even
for the deployment of most constellations since a
great number of small satellites should be collected
together for one launch in order to economically
justify this launch.

The necessity to have a heavier launch vehicle than
the ‘Cyclone’, which already provided the same
capability, was stipulated by those payloads which
required this ‘urgent launch on request’. The first of
them was the ‘Tselina’ elint satellite in a few
different options. Although the ‘Tselina’ series’
first satellite (‘Tselina-O’) was being launched by
the ‘Cyclone-3’, its flight testing showed that the
composition of the on-board equipment should be
expanded and its instruments and units should be
Webb

Therefore, the ‘Zenit-s’ launch system can be
referenced as an example of the ‘responsive access’
realisation for the times when the satellites to be
urgently launched were heavy ones and which has
become unsuitable for this purpose when the
satellites to be launched are small ones. However,
the main concepts and technical solutions which
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were laid down into the ‘Zenit-2’s’ design and,
especially, its launch site would be adopted for the
developments of new, smaller launch systems for
the ‘responsive access’ concept realisation,
especially, for those which will use liquidpropellant (including cryogenic) propulsion.
Angara
The ‘Angara’ launch vehicle family which is being
realised by the Khrunichev Space Center includes,
beside the ‘Angara-5’ heavy option and the
‘Angara-3’ medium option, two options of the
small class, the ‘Angara-1.1’ and ‘Angara-1.2’ (see
Figure 8). While the heavier ‘Angara-3/5’ are being
realised in the first turn, the smaller options would
be realised nevertheless later, supposedly around
2010, since they will not require the construction of
a separate launch site (all of the family’s launch
vehicles should use a single launch facility which is
being currently built in Plesetsk).
This launch site in Plesetsk was reconstructed from
a former launch site for the ‘Zenit 2’ the
construction of which had been begun even in
USSR times. One of the requirements of the tender
for the ‘Angara’ development was that the new
launch vehicle would use the ‘Zenit’s’ launch site
with minimum up-gradings17.

Fig. 8. Designs of the URM, ‘Angara-1.1’ and
‘Angara-1.2’(left to right)

Therefore, the adoption of the ‘Zenit’s’ experience
for the ‘Angara’ development is one more example,
besides the ‘Rockot’, of how the basic launch
systems, which had been initially developed for a
provision of the ‘responsive access’ capability have
lost this capability in the process of their upgrading for normal commercial operation.

This requirement gave a reason to suppose that the
‘Angara-1.1/1.2’ would become the ‘Zenit-2’s’
diminished derivatives which would have the same
capabilities for the ‘responsive access’ realisation
but with less payload capabilities and which would
therefore mean their greater suitability for this
concept realisation.

Air Launch

However, this supposition has not been confirmed.
In the process of gradual mutual adaptation of the
family’s main option, ‘Angara-5’ and the launch
site which was being built for it, the launch site
including its launch facility was changed
significantly and certain features of the former
‘Zenit’s’ facility were lost. It is possible to consider
now that the launch site in Plesetsk has only a bit of
mutual similarity with the ‘Zenit’s’ launch site.

The ‘Air Launch’ project which is being currently
developed by a consortium of Russian companies
on a private basis beginning from 1997 and the
‘Ishim’ project which was begun to be developed at
the same time but has received some real support in
late 2005 are attributed to the launch systems that
use an ‘air launch’ concept. This feature gives
ground to suppose their suitability for the
‘responsive access’ concept realisation (the U.S.
RASCAL programme is based on the use of the
same concept as well, see Section 3).

The technology of the ‘Angara-1.1’ pre-launch
preparation will be somewhat similar to the
preparation of the current ‘Rockot’, since both
these launchers have the ‘Breeze-KM’ upper stage
as their top stages This upper stage is prepared
separately in a technical site and is mated
separately with the payload to be launched. This
technology does not provide for an urgent
preparation of the launch system as a whole. The
preparation process for the ‘Angara-1.2’ with its
new URM-2 second stage is as yet unknown.
However, it will be similar i.e. it will not provide
urgent preparation either.
Webb

Indeed, a carrier aircraft of an air-launch system
could be prepared within a relatively short time for
the flight in which the launch should be carried out
while it would provide a broad range of launch
azimuths, i.e. realised orbit inclinations due to the
flexibility of its flight routes. However, the same
cannot be said about the preparation of the used
launch vehicle before its loading into the aircraft
(or suspension under this airplane). Besides, the
aircraft cannot take more than one launch vehicle
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capability of the ‘Cyclone’. This parameter makes
the ‘Cyclone’ unacceptable for the provision of
‘responsive access’ in the current conditions when
the too high payload capability is expected to be
mostly unclaimed for even multi-satellite launches
(due to the difficulty in collecting a number of
small satellites for a single launch) to say nothing
about dedicated launches of single small satellites
by a launch vehicle with an excessive payload
capability (the specific launch price would be too
high in this case).

and its return back to the airfield plus the time of its
inter-flight maintenance would require tens of
hours i.e. the system’s readiness for the next launch
cannot be less than this total time even if the next
launch vehicle will wait for this carrier aircraft
while this launch vehicle will have to be prepared
in advance.
Therefore, a use of the ‘air launch’ concept does
not guarantee by itself the suitability of a launch
system for the ‘responsive access’ provision. The
design of the launch vehicle and its process of
preparation before loading into the carrier aircraft
(but not the process of pre-launch preparation
onboard the aircraft!) are important influential
factors as well. The ‘Air Launch’ and ‘Ishim’
launch systems differ significantly not only in these
two factors but even by the classes of carrier
aircraft. The ‘Air Launch’ project including its
evolution in the process of development was
described in detail in reference 8. The final version
which recently received an organizational (but not
financial!) support from the Russian Federal Space
Agency (Roscosmos) is based on the use of the An124 ‘Ruslan’ heavy cargo airplane as a carrier
aircraft from which the especially designed ‘Polyot’
liquid-propellant launch vehicle should be pushed
out in a launch container that should be braked and
turned into a launch position by a parachute system.

Ishim
The most recent ‘Ishim’ project is being currently
developed on the order of Kazakhstan and will be
the property of this country. However, the project is
being developed by Russian companies on the basis
of Russia-owned technologies and experience and
the resulting launch systems will be operated,
apparently, with Russian technical assistance.
Moreover, this system could be repeated simply for
Russian national needs or even for commercial use
by Russian operators. For these considerations, the
‘Ishim’ project is included in this report as an
evident example of the most recent Russian
developments in the investigated field.
The ‘Ishim’ project is based on the earlier
development of the MiG-31 heavy fighter-based
launch system for an anti-satellite purpose which
had been ready for tests before the USSR collapse.
The ‘civil’ derivative of it is the ‘Converted
Contact’8. This ‘Converted Contact’ project was
proposed by the MiG aviation company in 1998.
The solid-propellant launch vehicle for this launch
system had to be developed by the ‘Vympel’
Experimental Design Bureau (OKB) which was one
of main developers of the FSU anti-aircraft missiles
and had been, apparently, the developer of the antisatellite missile for the project’s most early
version18.

This two-stage launch vehicle designed by the
Makeev SRC should use cryogenic propellant
(liquid oxygen/kerosene) in both of the stages.
While this chosen design provoked a serious
criticism for its doubtful suitability for long-time
transportation by air in a fuelled condition and for
its problematic capability to withstand g-loads
during the pushing-out and the turn-around in the
air (see reference 8), the launch vehicle would also
have serious obstacles for its application to the
‘responsive access’ realisation.
One of these obstacles is that the system should
have a sufficiently powerful on-ground facility for
fuelling with liquid oxygen. This facility should
have the capability for an urgent fuelling operation
and, besides, should have the capability to provide
the next fuelling of the following launch vehicle
after a period of time which is defined by the time
of the carrier aircraft’s readiness for the next flight.
In turn, the heavy An-124 cannot be prepared for
this next time urgently, its interflight maintenance
requires no less than one day, especially after a
flight at maximum range with a complete
consumption of on-board fuel stocks.

However, this project found neither state support,
nor commercial customers at that time. The project
has been changed in recent times by a replacement
of the ‘Vympel’s’ two-stage launch vehicle with
another solid-propellant launcher to be developed
by the Moscow Institute for Thermal Technology
(MIT) which had been the developer of the ‘Topol’
ICBM and ‘Start’ launch vehicle family. The MIT
also became the prime developer of the project.
The project was presented to Prime Minister of the
Kazakhstan Republic on March 2005. Kazakhstan
was searching for potential directions for the
country’s future space activity, this aspiration was
grounded, besides certain practical considerations,
with the location of the Baikonur spaceport in
Kazakhstan’s territory which has provided the

However, the main obstacle is the ‘Polyot’ launch
vehicle’s expected payload capability. This payload
capability for LEO should be at the level of 3-4
tons which is comparable with the payload
Webb
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country with the nominal status of a ‘space state’
and this status had to be kept, proceeding from
considerations of the country’s international image.
Besides an order for their own ‘KazSat’
communication satellite and the establishment of
the Russian/Kazakhstan ‘Baiterek’ project (a
deployment of the operation of the ‘Angara-5’
heavy launch vehicle’s option from Baikonur), the
Kazakhstan’s government considered that a certain
simpler launch system for the launches of small
satellites would be useful for a quick transformation
of their country into a real ‘space power’.

Fig. 9. A model of the ‘Ishim’ launch system’s
MiG-31I carrier aircraft with a suspended
launch vehicle
a diameter of 1.34 m and the following dimensions
of the payload accommodation zone: a length of 1.4
m and diameter of 0.94 m. Being launched from the
MiG-31I at an altitude of 15-18 km with a speed of
2120-2230 km/h, this launch vehicle would inject a
payload with a mass of 160 kg into a circular LEO
with an altitude of 300 km and inclination of 46º (or
120 kg into an orbit with an altitude of 600 km).
The take-off mass of the MiG-31I with the
suspended launch vehicle has to be 50 tons, its
range to the launch point has to be 600 km20.

The MIT/MiG project promised this opportunity
and
a
contract
for
this
project
development/realisation was signed by the
Kazakhstan’s government with the MIT in late
200519.
An additional argument for this contract signing
was that Kazakhstan had inherited two MiG-31D
aircraft after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
These aircraft were especially up-graded for the
role of carrier aircraft for the above-mentioned antisatellite missile. (Both of these aircraft were,
apparently, at the Sary-Shagan test range in
Kazakhstan where they had been prepared for the
beginning of the anti-satellite system’s flight
testing).

The ‘Ishim’ launch system would provide a broad
range of orbit inclinations including polar and
equatorial planes for orbits, especially, if the system
will be based at the territories of foreign countries
(common airfields of first class will be suitable for
this purpose)20.

The contracted project received the ‘Ishim’
appellation (’Ishim’ is the name of one of the rivers
in Kazakhstan). The total cost of the contract was
about US$ 144 mln. Flight tests of the ‘Ishim’
launch system should be begun in 2007, apparently
from the Sary-Shagan test range where the system
would be based for its operation after the testing
completion20.

Due to the use of a solid-propellant launch vehicle
which will not require a long time for its on-ground
preparation and which would be stored in a number
of almost ready examples near to the used airfield
(the Sary-Shagan test range has both a suitable
airfield and corresponding storehouses) as well as,
thanks to the use of the carrier aircraft on the basis
of fighter (for which a short-time for inter-flight
maintenance is a typical feature), the ‘Ishim’ launch
system would provide a meeting of the first two
requirements for the ‘responsive access’ realisation
(see Section 2 above).

The MiG-31D should be up-graded into the MiG31I option, a model of which with a suspended
launch vehicle was shown in February 2006 at the
‘Asian Aerospace 2006’ Airshow in Singapore (this
model is shown in Figure 9). Besides this air-launch
component, the ‘Ishim’ launch system should
include the on-ground facilities for the preparation
of the launch vehicles and their payloads and a
flying command/tracking station-aircraft to be
developed on the basis of the IL-76MD cargo
airplane20. (This
concept
of
a
‘flying
command/tracking station’ had been already
proposed in the ‘Diana-Burlak’ project where it was
adopted from the practice of cruise missile flighttesting.)

Regarding the third requirement, which is
concerned with the provision of minimum specific
launch prices, it is possible to make a supposition
only since the values of launch prices for the
‘Ishim’ have not been yet announced.
It is supposed in numerous sources, see for example
reference 18, that the maximum specific launch
price which can be paid by ‘civil’ launch customers
is around US$ 10,000 per kilogram of payload. In
this case, the total price for an ‘Ishim’ launch
would be no more than US$ 2 mln which seems to
be too low for the especially developed launch
system with its significant expenditures for
development. It is possible to suppose that this
launch price would be rather at the level of US$ 3-4
mln. This means that the specific launch price

The three-stage solid-propellant launch vehicle
which is being developed by the MIT on the basis
of the ‘Start’ launcher’s technologies should have a
launch mass of 10.3 tons, a total length of 10.76 m,
Webb
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would be around US$ 20,000…25,000 per
kilogram which exceeds the values which were
recognized as acceptable for a realisation of the
RAC. However, with this specific launch price
level, the launch system would be found to be
uncompetitive in the worldwide market of launch
services even for the provision of common launch
missions. Therefore, Kazakhstan’s ownersoperators of the system will be forced to lower this
specific price down to the above-mentioned level of
US$ 10,000 per kilogram, at least, even at the
expense of their profit, especially taking into
consideration Kazakhstan’s aspiration to enter this
market independently from any other countries.

frame of this report. Therefore, those foreign launch
systems which are being developed for the
‘responsive access’ realisation for military purposes
only, such as the U.S. RASCAL programme’s ones
and French RLS, or those systems which are being
already in operation but cannot be used for
commercial launches, for example, the U.S.
‘Minotaur’ are not assessed as foreign competitors
for the chosen Russian launch systems. Actually,
only the U.S. ‘Falcon-1’ can be currently assessed
in this capacity. However, it can be even more
important to estimate the competitiveness of the
chosen Russian systems between themselves as
well as with the Falcon-1.

Hence, this specific launch price of US$ 10,000 per
kilogram can be assumed as the value which would
be offered for launches in the frame of ‘responsive
access’ concept realisation. This value, although
exceeding the supposed level of specific launch
price which was laid down in the RASCAL
programme is less than the value which would be
offered by the ‘Falcon-1’ small launch vehicle.

The chosen launch systems present three different
methods of launch: the silo-launched ‘Strela’, the
‘Start-1’ which is being launched from a mobile
launch device, and the air-launched ‘Ishim’. Each
of these methods have their own advantages and
shortcomings in regard to the ‘responsive access’
realisation.
Thus, the silo-launch method can provide a ‘quick
response’ i.e. a very urgent launch on response,
however, it cannot provide the next (repeat) launch
from the same silo. The task of numerous launches
on request with certain intervals but not the
simultaneous launch of a few satellites in a cluster
launch would be solved for this launch method by
the use of a few silos with ready launchers which
are already installed in these silos. This method
cannot be used for launches from a foreign
customer’s territory. The range of realised orbit
inclinations is also limited (it is defined by the
location of the silo).

It is possible to see one more advantage of the
‘Ishim’ launch system in regard of the ‘responsive
access’ provision. The system’s low payload
capability makes it most suitable for the dedicated
launches of small satellites with masses which do
not exceed 150 kg, while the small satellites of this
class are being assumed as the most probable
candidates to be launched in the frame of the
concept realisation21. At the same time, these
satellites would be launched for this purpose mostly
one at a time i.e. in dedicated launches.
The above-given considerations, together with the
high probability of the ‘Ishim’ launch system
project realisation (the corresponding items of
expenditures were already laid down in the
Kazakhstan state budget for 2005-200720) create a
ground for the further examination of the system as
a potential competitor in the case of the arising of a
demand for the ‘responsive access’ provision in the
worldwide market of launch services.

The method of using a mobile launch device can
provide a ‘responsive response’ in all the regards
including launches from a customer’s territory.
However, the range of realised orbit inclinations is
limited as well although to a lesser degree than for
the launches from silos since the point of launch is
a fixed one for each of the ordered launches (these
points in the customers’ territories would not
provide launches into desired orbit inclinations in
certain cases).

5. THE COMPETITIVE POTENTIAL OF
RUSSIAN LAUNCH SYSTEMS

The air-launch method expands this range
significantly (in limits which are defined by the
available range of carrier aircraft) while the time
for the next launch provision, which is defined by
the duration of the carrier aircraft’s back flight and
the aircraft’s inter-flight maintenance and not only
the readiness of the next launcher for suspension
under the aircraft plus the duration of the aircraft
flight to a launch spot would be more than for the
method of launch from a mobile launch device.

It would seem that three Russia-developed launch
systems, ‘Strela’, ‘Start-1’ and ‘Ishim’ are potential
competitors in the world’s market of launch
services in the case of a demand arising for the
realisation of the ‘responsive access’ concept on a
commercial, or at least civil, basis.
Cases of the concept realisation for the
deployments of military-purpose satellites in the
interests of the country-launch system developer or
on the order of that countries-allies are beyond the
Webb
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A meeting of the requirement 2 i.e. the provision of
a capability to carry out the next launch (launches)
within a short time after a preceding launch
completion (this is actually the condition which
defines a ‘quick-response’ launch system to be a
system for ‘responsive access’) can be fulfilled by
the investigated launch systems in the following
consequence of occupied positions which depend
on the durations of times to be required for the next
launch preparation: the ‘Start-1’ at the first
position, the ‘Falcon-1’ and ‘Ishim’ would share
the second-third positions while the ‘Strela’ is at
the worst position since it would meet this
requirement in a certain volume only by the
existence of a few loaded launch sites.

‘Falcon-1’ launch system is somewhat intermediate
between the silo-launch method and a launch from
a mobile launch device. Launches are from a fixed
location as for the silo launches but the process of
next launch preparation requires significantly less
time, however, this process duration is longer than
for the ‘Start-1’ mobile launch system in which a
launch container that has been used for a preceding
launch could be urgently replaced with a new
launch container with the installed launch vehicle.
Perhaps, the duration of this process for the
‘Falcon-1’ can be comparable with the duration of
the next launch preparation for the air-launched
‘Ishim’. The existence of a fast-mounted launch
facility for the ‘Falcon-1’ (the same type of launch
facility was developed for the U.S. ‘Taurus’ small
launch vehicle) would provide athe capability of
launches from foreign customers’ territories and
expand the range of realised orbit inclinations.
However, the mobile ‘Start-1’ and, moreover, the
air-launched ‘Ishim’ will have evident preferences
in this regard.

Besides the investigated launch systems’ features
which are defined by the launch method used and
on the basis of which the estimation of the launch
systems’ ranking is made above, there is also one
more technical parameter that is concerned
indirectly with a meeting of the requirement 3 (the
provision of a minimum specific launch price) for
each of the systems. This parameter is a payload
capability.

On the basis of this brief analysis, it is possible to
make a preliminary conclusion that, of these four
compared launch systems, the ‘Start-1’ and ‘Strela’
would meet the requirement 1 for the ‘responsive
access’ concept realisation in the best manner i.e.
they would launch the ordered satellites within the
shortest time after a request for its launch (this time
will be defined by the time to be required for the
pre-launch preparation of the satellite itself and
does not require any additional time even for the
launch vehicle fuelling). The ‘Ishim’ is at the third
position since, although its launch vehicle could be
prepared during the same time as the ‘Start-1’, the
carrier aircraft should spend an additional time for
this launch vehicle delivery to a launch spot. The
‘Falcon-1’ is at the last position since its fuelling
can be carried out only after the payload mating
while the technology of urgent fuelling (for
example, as in the ‘Cyclone’ and ‘Zenit’) is not
used in its launch site.

Indeed, even if a launch system provides a low
specific launch price but its payload capability is
significantly higher than that value which can be
forecasted as an optimum one for the supposed
market’s demand, this low specific price would
never be realised in the corresponding missions
since the launch vehicle will be used with an
incomplete payload while the launch price will be
fixed in any case.
As shown in reference 5, this optimum payload
capability would be at the level of around 500 kg
for a standard orbit with an altitude of 200 km and
with an inclination of 28º. This value is in
correspondence with the ‘Falcon-1’ payload
capability while the same parameter for the ‘Start1’ is also approximately the same. Therefore, both
of these launch systems would be suitable for a
complete use of their payload capabilities in the
case of ‘responsive access’ missions and their
specific launch prices which are calculated on a
basis of their maximum payload capabilities can be
used for a comparison of these launch systems
capability to meet the requirement 3.

In regard to this requirement’s additional assumed
statement i.e. to provide as wide as possible range
of realised orbit inclinations (in order to provide a
broad suitability of the launch system for the
various missions to be demanded) and to provide
the capability of launches from customer territories,
the ‘Ishim’ has an evident preference, the ‘Start-1’
is inferior to it but has a significant preference over
the ‘Falcon-1’ (in the case of a quickly erected
launch facility and use). The ‘Strela’ is at a last
position since it can provide only that range of
inclinations which is defined by the location of its
fixed launch suite.

Webb

The ‘Ishim’ should have half this optimum payload
capability. This means that this launch system
would miss a share of the available payloads which
will be intended for launches in the frame of the
supposed ‘responsive access’ concept realisation
but will be heavier than the top limit of the
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Table 1. Comparison of the investigated launch systems by requirements, parameters and features which
are concerned with the systems probable use for the RAC realisation
Requirement or
parameter, feature

Launch systems (ranking position by every the item)

Notes

‘Strela’

‘Start-1’

‘Ishim’

‘Falcon-1’

1. Capability to provide
an urgent launch on
response

Within no
more than 1
hour (1-2)

Within no
more than 1
hour (1-2)

Within no
more than 2-3
hours (3)

Within no
more than 3-5
hours (4)

-

2. Capability to provide
the launches from
customers’ territories

Absent (4)

Provides with
low
expenditures
(2)

Provides with
minimum
expenditures
(1)

Can provide
with certain
expenditures*
(3)

*In the case of
quickly-mounted
launch facility use

3. Range of realised
orbit inclinations

Fixed, defined
by the launch
silo location
(4)

Broad (2)

Most broad (1)

Broad* (3)

*In the case of
quickly-mounted
launch facility use

4. Capability to
urgently provide the
next launch (launches)

Low, within a
week* (4)

Very high,
within a few
hours (1)

Sufficiently
high, within a
day (2-3)

Sufficiently
high, within a
day (2-3)

*Would be
enhanced by a use
of a few launch
silos

5. Payload capability’s
correspondence to
optimum (most
probable) value

Oversized by
three times (4)

Corresponds
(1-2)

Less by two
times* (3)

Corresponds
(1-2)

*Nevertheless,
corresponds to the
expected mass of
certain number of
satellites to be
launched

6. Specific launch price
(US$ per a kilogram)

18,000* (3)

12,000-16,000
(2)

10,00015,000** (1)

18,000-20,000
(4)

*Calculated for
the payload mass
of 500 kg
**Supposed value

Total ranking position

3

1

2

4

-

‘Ishim’s’ payload capability. However, all of the
‘Ishim’ launches which would be carried out in the
frame of the concept realisation can be considered
to be completely loaded and the launch system’s
assumed specific launch price can be used for a
comparison as well.

At the same time, it is possible to take into
consideration a small additional preference of the
‘Strela’ system that it, the only one among the
investigated systems, could be used for the
simultaneous injections of a few ‘responsive
access’ concept’s small satellites with masses of up
to 500 kg each in a cluster launch.

In contrast with the ‘Ishim’, the ‘Strela’ has its
maximum payload capability of three times more
than the optimum value. This gives grounds for a
supposition that this launch system could be used
for all the ‘responsive access’ missions, but its
specific launch price for a majority of these
missions can be considered to be three times more
than the value which is calculated proceeding from
the launch vehicle’s maximum payload capability.

So, the ‘Start-1’ and ‘Falcon-1’ can be compared
with regard to meeting requirement 3 by their
calculated specific launch prices, the ‘Ishim’ can be
compared by its supposed specific launch price,
while the ‘Strela’s’ calculated value should be
multiplied by three for this comparison. The
resulting values per kilogram are US$ 12,00016,000 for the ‘Start-1’, US$ 10,000-15,000 for the
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However, this experience would be used for those
launch systems, both Russian and foreign ones, that
would be especially developed for this purpose,
especially if these systems will use liquidpropellant launch vehicles. An example of this
experience’s supposed application would be an
improvement of the current ‘Falcon-1’ launch
system in order to enhance its competitiveness
against the ‘Start-1’ and ‘Ishim’.

‘Ishim’, US$ 18,000-20,000 for the ‘Falcon-1’ and
US$ 18,000 for the ‘Strela’.
A comparison of these values shows that the
‘Ishim’ would exceed other launch systems in
regard to a lower offered specific launch price.
However, this system’s value is rather assumed
than calculated (see above). Among the other
systems, the ‘Start-1’ has a certain preference while
the ‘Strela’ is at approximately the same level as
the ‘Falcon-1’ despite the value for the ‘Strela’
being calculated with a taking into consideration of
the correction for its high (non-optimum) payload
capability (see above).

6. CONCLUSIONS
1. A few launch systems to be intended for a
realisation of the basic principles of the current
‘responsive access’ concept were developed in the
former Soviet Union (FSU) and the gained
experience is at the disposal of Russian space
companies.

All the advantages and shortcomings for the
investigated launch systems are summarized in
Table 1 below in order to make a final comparison.

2. The developed launch systems, ‘Cyclone’,
‘Zenit’ and ‘Rockot’ could realise the laid-down
principles but cannot be used any more for a
realisation of the concept in its current definition
due to either an oversized payload capability (the
‘Cyclone’ and ‘Zenit’), or a transfer to the use of
another type of launch site and changing the
technologies of pre-launch preparation (the
‘Rockot’).

This comparison Table shows that the Russiadeveloped launch systems would have a significant
preference over the U.S. ‘Falcon-1’. This
preference is stipulated by their readiness for a
launch on response which is provided by an
adoption of their basic prototypes (ballistic
missiles) corresponding capabilities, with their
lower specific launch prices which are provided by
the opportunity to use decommissioned military
hardware, and by a smaller size of launch vehicle
(for the ‘Ishim’) or with more flexibility in the
change of launch sites (for the ‘Start-1’ and
‘Ishim’). Besides, the ‘Start’ was shown to be in
almost complete accordance with the optimum
value of payload capability which was defined for
the supposed demand for the ‘responsive access’
concept realisation.

3. Three current Russian launch systems, all of
which are based on missiles technologies, are found
to be suitable for the concept realisation in the
current conditions. There are the operational ‘Start1’, the ‘Strela’ which has begun its flight testing
and the ‘Ishim’, a project which is being developed
by Russian companies on Kazakhstan’s order. The
‘Start-1’ and ‘Ishim’ would become serious
competitors against foreign launch systems that
either are already developed (for example, the U.S.
‘Falcon-1’), or would be developed especially for
the ‘responsive access’ concept realisation.

The above-made conclusion about the high
competitiveness of the Russian launch systems has
no regard to the main purpose of the ‘responsive
access’ concept which is concerned with military
satellite missions (although the analysis as
performed would be useful for the assessment of
the Russian potential for using these launch systems
for certain of its own ‘responsive access’ militarypurpose space systems). However, this conclusion
shows that evidently the current Russian launch
systems which were and are developed on the basis
of missiles technologies are found to be suitable for
a realisation of the ‘responsive access’ concept
despite their present developments not pursuing this
goal.

4. A certain share of the experience which was
gained in the FSU in the field of liquid-propellant
launch systems for the ‘responsive access’
provision could be adopted by foreign developers
of the same type of launch systems, for example,
for an improvement of the ‘Falcon-1’ launch
system in order to enhance its competitiveness.
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